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Introduction
Canada would not be content to be “only an echo of somebody else’s voice. . .”1
Lester B. Pearson, a former prime minister of Canada made this statement in regards to
the United States exerting influence on the government of Canada and its policies. He
chose, rather, a breakaway from U.S. influence and to allow Canada to conduct and
create its own foreign policies and decisions regarding external affairs. During the course
of the twentieth century, American influence has pervaded all areas of Canadian military
and defence policy, up to and including border defence, national security and
international obligations. This paper examines those Canadian military and defence
decisions that have been either directly or indirectly influenced by the United States
government and its officials.
The beginning of the twentieth century brought about a completely new aspect of
Canadian decision making, especially in the realm of military and defence policy. With
the emergence of hostile-intentioned world powers, both Canada and the United States
had to begin to focus on how North America would defend itself. With the two countries
sharing what is and has been the world’s largest unguarded border between two states, it
is no surprise that ideas and influence have crossed over that border from both sides.
As the United States was the older country, Canada not having achieved
independent status until 1867, it was not surprising to see that the United States had more
influence over Canadian government officials. Much of the influence the United States
placed on Canada was direct influence. American officials would give the Canadian
government the position of the United States on certain issues, and in return, would
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expect the American ideas inserted into the findings and policies of the Canadian
government. Other influences have come indirectly. The American position of an issue
would be given to the Canadian government and foreign policy would be drafted, with no
mention made of the United States having a say in what was being dictated. Over time,
the influence becomes so ingrained into the policy-making decisions that the
phenomenon of “unanticipated militarism” occurs. “Unanticipated militarism,” a concept
founded by Morris Janowitz, is defined as the “gradual acceptance of policies that do not
always coincide with the government’s own assessments of the exigencies of the
international strategic environment.”2 This concept will be mentioned later in this paper.
Over the course of the twentieth century, both direct and indirect influences were
enforced on the government of Canada by the United States. Continental security, along
with the two world wars and other military engagements fought during this century, were
of severe importance to both states in terms of military and defence policy. Since these
events were vital to “regional security,” the United States used them to impose its
policies on the Canadian government.
Fundamental Beginnings: 1900-1914
During the early years of the twentieth century, relations between the United
States and Canada were cordial and uneventful. To the world, the two states appeared to
have a friendly relationship. Internally, however, the Canadian government was in fear
of a United States takeover of Canada. A former prime minister of Canada, Sir Wilfrid
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Laurier, even once said that he liked Americans, but he also knew that they were “caring
only for Canada in so far as it may serve their purpose to be friendly.”3
During these first years of the twentieth century, the Canadian government was
not in fear of foreign powers committing hostile acts against their country. Officials in
the Canadian government were more concerned with the United States government
exerting too much influence over them. In 1907, negotiations were in progress between
the Canadian government and the United States over defence of the two states on the
Great Lakes. According to the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, Canada and the United
States both restricted themselves to having only four armed vessels each on the Lakes.4
When the Americans built and launched the Nashville, the largest ship launched on the
Lakes, Canadian officials did not protest for fear of a naval arms race with the United
States.5 The American government used brute strength and intimidation to directly
influence the Canadian government so the agreement could be amended in interpretation.
Laurier, in speaking for the Canadian government, also told the British ambassador in
Washington, that Canadians, himself especially, lived “in fear and trembling all the time”
of what would happen if his country defied the American government.6
Following the consolidation of ideas between the two governments, agreements
were made regarding the defence of both states on the Great Lakes. Over the next seven
years, negotiations and agreements would focus on trade and economics. Then, in 1914,
everyone’s worst fears came true. A world war broke out.
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The First World War: 1914-1918
In 1914, the Austrian-Hungarian empire launched the First World War and
enveloped all of Europe in conflict. When Great Britain entered the war, Canada entered
the war as well to assist in the defence of the British Empire.7 When the American
government made the decision to not enter the war, this flared a dispute between the
American and Canadian governments. The American ideal of isolationism did not appeal
to the Canadian government. While the United States government attempted to engage
Canadian officials that the war in Europe was Europe’s problem, members of the
Canadian government were convinced that the defence of the British Empire was at stake.
The typical reaction throughout the Canadian government was resentment towards the
United States as they [the U.S.] believed they were “too proud to fight.”8 Even with that
said, the United States continued its attempt to indirectly influence Canada into staying
out of the war.
While Canadian officials believed the United States was turning away from its
responsibilities to the world, the beliefs of the United States government was the exact
opposite.9 Those involved in the U.S. government became aware of how much the
United States was becoming involved, even though it was still maintaining a neutral
status at this stage of the war. Following the Vanceboro incident of 1915, in which a
German saboteur attempted to destroy the Canadian-American Bridge at Vanceboro,
Maine, United States officials began keeping a closer watch on all border-crossing
activity. This attempt at sabotage and the subsequent American response occurred two
years prior to the United States entering the war effort.
7
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With the United States maintaining its neutrality argument, they should have been
unable to support the war effort, either through manpower or weaponry. This was not the
case, however. In 1915, United States officials convinced British officials to allow for
the shipping of U.S. materials and experts to Canadian shipyards. These materials were
then assembled into warships to be used for the defence of the European coasts. When
Canada found out about the subterfuge, British officials immediately apologized, taking
the blame for the entire incident. Even though the United States was partly, if not
entirely, responsible for the incident, there was no mention made of United States
involvement.10
When the United States finally entered the war in 1917, the influence placed on
Canada only got worse. With Great Britain and the United States forming an alliance,
Canada was conveniently left behind. American assistance and influence was now
waited upon, and knowing this, Great Britain was able to leave all Canadian defence
questions in the hands of the United States. When Robert Borden, the then-Prime
Minister, asked Great Britain for assistance, the answer returned was the same it always
had been. The United States would be there to assist Canada in its defence.11 Indirectly,
the United States, through all of its coerciveness, had become the defence authority for
Canada.
In part, the relations between Canada and the United States during the war years
were manageable. The two had come together during a critical time, and for the most
part, succeeded in defending themselves and each other. At the end of the war, however,
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many in the Canadian government, Borden especially, realized that Canada had become
too dependent and needed to become more self-reliant.12
The Interim Years: 1918-1939
Following the conclusion of the First World War, Canada established its first
diplomatic representative in a foreign country, located in Washington, D.C. This was
done so that Canada could directly conduct foreign policy with the United States.13 This
would, however, become an easier way for the United States to directly influence the
Canadian government, as this provided for the “streamlining” of the foreign policy
process.
In 1921, Canadian, American and British officials were engaged in negotiations
on the issue of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in place since 1902. This agreement had
been drafted as a mutual assistance treaty against unprovoked aggression. The United
States was concerned that Japan and Great Britain, the two greatest naval rivals to the
United States, would be given too much power in the interpretation of this treaty. The
United States convinced Canada to speak out against this treaty. The influence was
successful as Arthur Meighen, the Conservative prime minister following Borden, was
responsible for lobbying officials in London that a “contented United States must be the
central aim of British foreign policy.”14 While the focus of the negotiations was to have
Great Britain give up the alliance with Japan, the direct influence placed on Canada by
the United States was responsible for that dissolution.
The 1920s passed with no Canadian foreign policy decisions being influenced by
the United States government. The Roosevelt administration was elected in 1932 and, at
12
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the height of the Great Depression, implemented the New Deal to rebuild the American
economy. Many of the programs started by the administration had far-reaching results.
Many of the government officials of both countries were in negotiations with each other
to assist in the monetary revitalization of the United States, yet some of the programs also
helped to stimulate the Canadian economy.
Two such officials in charge of the negotiations were Dean Acheson, Franklin
Roosevelt’s secretary of state, and William Herridge, minister to the United States from
Canada. Acheson, in praise of his friend Herridge, made the comment that Herridge was
“one of the ablest diplomats this country [the U.S.] has received. . .a result of his success
with ‘the fellows behind the scenes,’ especially important because the New Deal led to a
proliferation of agencies whose activities were of interest to Canada.”15 The direct
influence the agencies and departments established during the New Deal had on the
Canadian government led to the economic assistance the United States desperately
needed. With the United States pulling itself out of economic despair, and Canada
providing the assistance that was needed, all members of government believed that the
world was in order.
During the 1930s, the entire world watched as fascism and totalitarianism rose to
power in Europe. Canada and the United States, both feeling safe and protected by three
thousand miles of ocean, knew their defence was vital to each other. Both Roosevelt and
Mackenzie-King knew that Canada’s defence policy and strength was not up to
America’s standards.

15
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In 1937, Roosevelt took a sailing tour up the coast of the western United States,
intending to sail to Washington, but sailing on to Vancouver, British Columbia. During
this trip, he commented on the “lamentable” conditions of the Canadian naval forces and
coast defences. Roosevelt made it clear to anyone that would listen that the United States
would have to take care of its own defences, and if that meant overstepping Canadian
forces, then so be it. The United States was not one to stand idly by and would be forced
to “do a great deal there” to protect North American defence.16 This remark greatly
influenced the Canadian government directly, as it now knew that its defences were weak
and were unable to stand up to the United States’ standards.
In 1938, during a speech at Queen’s University in Kingston, Roosevelt said that
the United States would “not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened
by any other empire.”17 This influence, placed directly on Mackenzie King, pressured the
Canadian government into making reforms in its defence policy. While Canada was
pleased with the support of the United States, it felt pressured by the obligations placed
on it by the United States. Canada believed that it was only responsible for what it
“reasonably expected to make it” and protecting the United States from an enemy that
emanated from Canadian territory.18
By the end of the 1930s, the world knew that it was in trouble. Totalitarianism
had completely taken over most of the major governments in Europe, and in 1939, the
world once again found itself at war.

16
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The Second World War: 1939-1945
In 1939, the armies of Germany invaded Poland, igniting the Second World War.
Within a year, all of Europe would find itself enveloped in this horrific atrocity. As much
as Canada wanted to support Great Britain in its defence against the forces of Adolf
Hitler, then-Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie-King was convinced that sending
Canadian troops would destroy Canadian unity.19 Great Britain, on the other hand, was
not as convinced and attempted to persuade Mackenzie-King to send troops to the
European front. King, however, decided to adopt the United States’ stance on the war.
King was “suspicious of Whitehall’s [England’s] intentions and convinced that Canada’s
best chance to prosper was by accepting, as the United States had done, its destiny as a
North American nation, he wanted to keep out of the overseas wars and
entanglements.”20 The United States convinced Canada that a war in Europe was
Europe’s problem. The indirect influence that was placed on Canada by the United
States led to Canada taking a stance against the British government and establishing its
own identity as a North American nation, not a European commonwealth.
It was also during this time that the United States and Great Britain began making
agreements corresponding to defence strategies and military arrangements. In late 1939,
the United States negotiated with Great Britain to place Canadian military forces under
American control. The Canadian military was not consulted on this agreement, yet was
directly influenced by the agreement. This specific Anglo-American agreement placed
Canadian naval and air forces under American strategic command. Following the
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announcement of this agreement, the commander of the Newfoundland Escort Force
made a public statement, commenting that Britain had “sold us down the river.”21
By 1940, Nazi Germany had invaded most of Europe. By June of that year,
France had fallen to German forces and as Winston Churchill said, “. . .the battle of
France has ended and the battle of Britain has begun.”22 Canada’s independent and
isolationist stance came to an end and troops and a navy were needed to send to Europe
to defend the coasts of Britain.
Not all of the influence placed on the Canadian government came from the
government of the United States, but rather by and through specific individuals within the
United States government. In August of 1940, President Roosevelt met with Prime
Minister Mackenzie-King at Ogdensburg, New York. Mackenzie-King did not bring any
advisers to this meeting and the two met alone. At the end of the meeting, the two
announced the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), a coalition of
the two countries’ military forces that would provide a strategic defence plan for North
America.23 The influence placed on Mackenzie-King by Roosevelt is not really known,
but with no advisers present at the meeting, it was entirely possible that Roosevelt strongarmed Mackenzie-King into signing the agreement without first consulting Parliament.
Immediately following the Ogdensburg Agreement, the United States made the
decision to put the treaty and the PJBD into effect. In September 1940, officials of Great
Britain and Canada mapped out a “destroyers-for-bases” agreement, in which British
destroyers would be exchanged for a British troop presence on Canadian island bases in
21
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the Atlantic. Over the next few months, Canadian officials became uneasy when
Newfoundland became entangled in the agreement. The air bases on Newfoundland
became a forward staging area for American troops, only after which Canada was
notified of an agreement giving the United States a long-term lease on bases during an
emergency. All of these agreements were undertaken despite Canadian objection and
were indirectly influenced by the American government, which acted through the
government of Great Britain.24
By September 1941, the United States was finding itself more integrated in
Canadian military policy. By this time, the Royal Canadian Navy was escorting ships
through the Atlantic Ocean as well as hunting German U-boats. Admiral Ernie King, the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Fleet, wrote to Canada’s naval chief of
staff, that the Canadian navy did not have the “opportunity to conduct the work involved
on the scale required.”25 The American government, specifically the Navy, took matters
into its own hands and exerted direct influence in the form of placing the Canadian naval
operations under its own command, infuriating the Canadian commanders.26
As the war raged on, the United States found more and more reasons to invade
Canada, both physically and politically. In 1942, the United States Army began
construction on what was to become the Alaskan Highway, a military route designed to
ferry military aircraft to Alaska, to protect American interests from Japanese forces in the
Aleutian Islands. This “highway” was comprised of military airfields scattered
throughout the northern United States, territories in Canada, and ending in Alaska. Many
of the airfields built in Canada, mainly the Northwest Territories, however, were built
24
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without Canadian knowledge.27 Malcolm MacDonald, the British high commissioner in
Canada, reported to Prime Minister Mackenzie-King, warning him of the influence the
Americans were placing on Canada by way of the Alaskan Highway. In his report, he
said the United States was making decisions that directly placed Canadian interests at
risk, all in the name of American interests. Members of the Canadian government had no
say in the building of the Alaskan Highway, as the United States needed these airfields as
they would become “of particular value for (a) commercial aviation and transport after
the war and (b) waging war against the Russians in the next world crisis.”28 The United
States did not take into consideration the burden it placed on the Canadian government,
who now not only had to protect its own soil, but the United States’ military interests
now in place in Canada.
By 1944, the tide of war had turned in favor of the Allies. The war was drawing
to a close, and unbeknownst to many, the United States was in the planning stages of the
Manhattan Project, the building of the atomic bomb. This project, spearheaded by the
United States, was of vital interest to Canada. While much of the uranium used in the
project was supplied by Canada, only a small number of Canadian scientists were
involved in the creation of the weapons.29 Canada, under the direct influence of
American military authorities and physicists, found itself not being allowed to give input
to the secrets of atomic power creation. With the United States taking the lead on the
project, Canada was denied its place in the scientific community and thus all credit for
the first practical application of atomic energy in warfare was given to the United States.

27
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Cold War Beginnings: 1945-1950
In April 1945, the entire world watched as hostilities came to a conclusion in
Europe. Later that year, in August, the world once again rejoiced upon the conclusion of
war in the South Pacific and Asia. World War II was over and the world was a new
place. New nations were born; others were destroyed. The world was revolving in its
life cycle and a new international regime was created, with the United States and the
Soviet Union as the forerunners and competitors.
Canada, because of its location, was immediately aligned with the United States
when the Cold War erupted. Lester Pearson, who assumed the post of underSecretary of State for External Affairs in 1946, was convinced that Canada could only
deal with the issues that were “on the periphery of East-West relations, since Canada’s
firm commitment to the latter deprived it of credibility. . .”30 Since Canada was in close
proximity to the United States and was tied to the British Commonwealth, its
“effectiveness depended on close relations with its principal allies, the United States and
the United Kingdom. . .”31 Canada, because of the influence placed principally by the
United States, had lost its identity as a sovereign state, and gained the reputation as a
subsidiary United States.
By the end of the 1940s, the Cold War front lines had been drawn and states were
placed on sides. The Warsaw Pact was defined as the Soviet Union and all of its satellite
countries in Eastern Europe, while in 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) was formed by the United States, Canada, and their allies in Western Europe.32
During the process of drafting the founding documents, Canada was under severe
30
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influence by the United States. Prior to signing the original treaty, Canada wanted to be
assured that its objectives were adhered. Hume Wrong, the ambassador from Canada to
the United States, who was placed in charge of the negotiations in Washington, DC,
voiced the main objective of the Canadian government. This objective was that the
wording of the treaty contained a clearly defined security guarantee; without this, Canada
would refuse to sign.33 In December 1948, Wrong took his case before the Cabinet of
Canada to approve the wording of the NATO treaty, and conducted negotiations between
Louis St Laurent, who at the time was the Canadian envoy to Washington, DC, and Dean
Acheson, the American Secretary of State.
During the course of negotiations, signatory members were placing influence on
each other in order to gain concessions over one another. The leader in influencing was
the United States. Canada, opposed to allowing Italy entrance into NATO, immediately
withdrew its opposition when the United States declared that Italy had a strategic
position, and was therefore worth of admission.34 The United States’ opinion outweighed
all others, was seen as the rule, rather than the exception, and in negotiations, was not to
be refuted.
Once all of the wordings of the treaty were negotiated, and agreements were in
order, the respective states took the treaty to their governments. In Canada, the treaty
was placed before the House of Commons for ratification. On March 28, 1949, the
House approved the treaty with only two dissenting votes, thus strongly stating that
Canada would be highly involved in global security.35
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Once the threat of communism reached the United States, its impact on Canada
immediately took precedence in defence policy. While not a physical defence issue,
Canada became immersed in the security of its borders. The United States had such a
hold on Canadian policy, so much so that it was allowed to investigate Canadian officials
for possible communist actions. Herbert Norman, the head of the Canadian liaison in
Tokyo, was put under investigation by the American government for possible communist
activities and affiliations, and was subsequently subpoenaed by the United States House
of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities.36 Norman, who was
eventually recalled from his post and placed in a research position, was himself a direct
recipient of American influence. Norman, reassigned as the Canadian ambassador to
Egypt, would eventually commit suicide in Cairo in 1957, with many believing he had
been “hounded to death by irresponsible allegations before uncontrollable Congressional
committees.”37
While Canada was focused on ideological defence, the United States put its
attention on physical defence and continental security. While Canada was preoccupied
with the spread of communism within its borders, the United States feared the spread
worldwide, as well as within its borders. Thus began the use of proxy wars, those wars
not directly involving the major actors, but rather fought between satellite states.
Korean War: 1950-1953
The first proxy war fought during the Cold War was in Korea. When North
Korea invaded South Korea in the name of unifying the country under a flag of
communism, the United States, under the banner of United Nations intervention, inserted
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troops to battle the North Koreans. While “officially a UN war, the first of its kind, it
was really Washington’s war and the U.S. very quickly began exerting diplomatic
pressure on its friends to send troops to help stop the Communist advance.”38 Canada,
not wanting to lose credibility with the United Nations, sent troops as well. “The
minister of national defence and his officials, however, were hesitant about assigning a
military contingent on the grounds that there were not enough adequately trained troops
available.”39 Canadian officials, influenced by their positioning in the world, sent troops,
knowing that it would not be able to support them and provide proper equipment, in the
name of saving face among the United States and other nations. The indirect influence
placed by the United States, under the guise of the United Nations, led to an unprepared
military being inserted into a conflict not of its own making, into an area of the world that
was “not a sphere of much interest to Canada.”40
The Korean War also brought about a new era in United States-Canadian
relations. This was the first time during the history of relations that Canadian officials
were willing to question the actions of the United States and its influence on Canadian
endeavors. Escott Reid, a key assistant to Lester Pearson, summed up the opinions of
many Canadian officials when he said, “If you consider the United States is proposing to
do something unwise and dangerous. . ., how far do you go in standing up to them and
opposing them in public?”41 Canada, while pressing for an armistice in Korea, was
finally standing up to the influences placed on it by the United States, even under the
auspices of the withdrawal of aid and assistance from the United States. Pearson, well
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aware of the “disadvantages that might result, but keeping the Korean War limited and
bringing it to an end as soon as possible were important enough," he believed, "to run the
risk of American anger.”42 The consequences of going against American policies were
becoming unimportant to Canada and the decisions it made reflected this thinking.
Continental Defence: 1953-1960
After the armistice in Korea in 1953, officials in Canada and the United States
turned their attention to continental defence. Soviet aggression was on every official’s
mind, and the continent needed to be defended at all costs. Canada, however, would soon
find itself on the receiving end of American directives.
The beginning of joint cooperation for continental defence began in 1951 with the
creation of a radar station system that extended from British Columbia to southern
Ontario. This system became known as the Pinetree Line, set in place to provide an
advance warning in the event of an air attack.43 By 1954, Canada and the United States
had created a series of radar systems, totaling thirty-four stations. The “agreement to
build the radar chains ushered in a new phase in continental defence collaboration, with
the United States expected to propose an integrated North American air command.”44
Many Canadian officials feared a takeover of Canadian defence by the United States, as
they were convinced the United States wanted to propose, create, and implement a new
type of defence plan, one beneficial to U.S. interests.
The creation of the joint defence plan also led to the issue of who would be
responsible. Officials within Defence Liaison (1) Division, the section of the Department
of External Affairs responsible for defence and military policy, “observed, however, that
42
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the probable result could be ‘to have the responsibility for the air defence of Canada,
including the command of Canadian air defence forces, vested in a United States
officer.’”45 Canadian air forces would now be subject to the rules and regulations
imposed by a foreign officer, and under the direct influence of the United States
command. Fearing a loss of sovereignty was on the minds of all Canadian officials, as
this would be the most serious issue up to date in U.S.-Canadian relations.
In 1958, the issue of continental defence would take on immense proportions
when Canada and the United States entered into a formal arrangement, which would
become known as the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD). NORAD
combined the continental defence forces of Canada and the United States, aligning them
under a joint command. The forces were then to be used a first line of defence in the
event of strategic attacks by the Warsaw Pact. While the agreement was being drafted,
and after being sent to the Canadian government for approval, it was understood by
officials that “the Canadian military was under almost daily pressure from the military in
the United States.”46 The influence from the United States also came directly in the
formation, as when the compilation of forces was finally agreed to “the NORAD
Command was predicated upon a nuclear weapons role for Canadian air defence forces
operating in Canada and neither the Prime Minister nor the Department of External
Affairs was fully aware. . .”47 The United States took it upon itself to include the nuclear
weapons clause in the initial agreement without giving prior knowledge to anyone in the
Canadian government.
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It is during this period that Canadian defence policy found itself under the strains
of “unanticipated militarism,” mentioned earlier. Again, this concept is when policies are
gradually accepted, even when they do not coincide with the government’s ideals. The
prime example of this concept is the Canadian acceptance of American nuclear weapons.
The Canadian government was against the use of nuclear weapons in continental defence,
but due to the influence placed by the American government on Canadian officials,
Canada was left with no choice but to accept the weapons. The use of such weapons was
believed by many to be “directly related to activities arising from the cooperative
Canadian/US professional military relationship.”48 By accepting American nuclear
weapons, Canada cemented the position that it would listen to all American
“suggestions” to its defence policy.
From Cooperation to Vietnam and Back: 1960-1975
Once regional and continental defence was stabilized in North America, Canada
turned its eye to events occurring around the world. Many of them did not affect Canada
directly, but nevertheless, Canada was subject to influence from the American
government during these events.
In the early 1960s, the first event of global proportions that affected the Canadian
government was the Cuban missile crisis, taking place between the Americans and the
Soviets. Following the discovery of Soviet missile sites in Cuba, John F. Kennedy, then
the American president, readied plans for a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent Soviet
ships from reaching Cuba. The Canadian government was consulted, as the missiles that
would potentially be aimed at the United States would be capable of reaching Canada as
well. While the Cabinet in Canada wavered, the defence minister, Douglass Harkness,
48
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made the decision to stand beside the American government. The reasoning behind the
waver, however, was many believed, and voiced by minister of External Affairs Green
[Howard Green] that “if Canada went along with the Americans now ‘we’ll be their
vassals forever.’”49 Eventually, Prime Minister Diefenbaker would respond to the wishes
of his defence minister and the entire military would be placed on alert. Diefenbaker
was, however, angered, as under the terms of the NORAD agreement, Canada was to be
“entitled. . .to be fully consulted before the forces went on alert.”50 While the Canadian
public was upset with Diefenbaker for wavering in the face of Soviet initiated nuclear
war, the Cabinet was under the impression that the entire situation could have been
avoided, had it not been for American egoism.
By the mid-1960s, the United States found itself completely involved in the war
in Southeast Asia. Canada, however, had remained outside of American influence to
involve troops in the conflict. It was, however, involved in other ways, the main activity
being that of involvement in the International Control Commissions (ICC), founded
during the creation of the Geneva Convention in 1954. This commission was responsible
for the withdrawal of troops, the exchange of prisoners and the transfer of peoples from
North Vietnam to South Vietnam.51 While Kennedy was in office, during the beginning
stages of the war, the United States had made several attempts to ensure Canada’s
participation in the war. Each and every time, Canada flatly refused, claiming its
membership in the ICC “made an active role in the war impossible.”52 The American
influence placed on the Canadian government was, in this case, unsuccessful.
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After the war began to escalate further, and more American troops were being
inserted into both North and South Vietnam, American officials again began to attempt to
influence Canadian officials into sending Canadian troops into the fight. Canada made
the decision to send a communications team to Hanoi in attempt to negotiate with the
North Vietnamese, but was warned that the team would lose access “if they came ‘only as
a mouthpiece to American propaganda.’”53 Upon hearing this news, Pearson [Prime
Minister Lester B. Pearson] commented that it would be a “sad ending to our initiative [of
keeping some peace in Vietnam] in this matter if we became merely an instrument of
USA propaganda. . .”54 The influence that the United States had attempted, once again,
was unsuccessful in swaying the government officials of Canada into supporting the U.S.
position in Vietnam.
In 1965, Pearson delivered a speech at Temple University in Pennsylvania,
speaking out against the United States’ position in Vietnam. A two-man team, comprised
of Livingston Merchant, twice ambassador to Canada, and Arnold Heeney, twice
ambassador to the United States were then assigned to produce acceptable results “which
would make it easier to avoid divergencies in economic and other policies of interest to
each other.”55 Their report, Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership,
was seen as a response to Pearson’s speaking out against Johnson [U.S. President Lyndon
Johnson], as the report was distributed only a few short months after his Temple
University speech. Because of this, many in Canada believed that Heeney was duped by
Merchant into agreeing to the United States’ position. As one Canadian columnist stated,
“If the Heeney-Merchant doctrine catches on, it seems certain to confirm our lackey
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status.”56 While not a direct influence by the United States, many Canadian officials
believed that the accounts provided by Merchant and Heeney only served to lessen the
Canadian opinion to the world.
By 1968, tensions between the United States and Canada were taking their toll in
other areas of cooperation. While NORAD was under scrutiny already by the Canadian
government, and was due to expire, the realization came to both states that the “manned
bomber threat (the main reason for NORAD when the agreement had been signed in
1958) was slowly declining while the threat from ballistic missiles was growing. . .”57
Continued Canadian cooperation in NORAD rested solely on the level of Canadian
participation, rather than the need. The United States, politely “suggested” to the
Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and agreement was given by Pearson, that “studies
carried out by the board should be based on. . .continued Canadian participation. . .and
they relate to the extent and the form of Canadian co-operation in aerospace defence for
the period after 1968.”58
After reviewing the plans for continued Canadian cooperation, Pearson requested
further information from the United States on the threat of ballistic missiles. Robert
McNamara, the American secretary of defence, met with Canadian officials and informed
them that deployment of ballistic missiles for continental defence would be placed on
American soil and Canadian cooperation was no longer required.59 In a turnabout, the
United States influenced the Canadian government by not including them in defence
policy at all, making all decisions for continental defence on its own.
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By 1973, Canada removed itself completely from the Vietnam situation by pulling
out of the ICC. It no longer felt compelled to return to a situation in which its greatest
alliance, the United States, asserted itself against a foreign government with unattainable
results. By 1975, the United States had removed all of its troops from Vietnam, and once
again, Canada turned to the United States in an attempt to restore previous, more friendly,
relations.
Expansion and Missile Defence: 1975-1989
With the end of Vietnam, and the fall of Saigon, the largest by-proxy war of the
Cold War was over. Canada and the United States were able to turn their attentions to the
agreed upon enemy, the Soviet Union, and thus return to a sense of cooperation and
mutual engagement.
The first order of business for Canada, according to the United States, was an
upgrading of forces in Europe. The Soviet threat had to be neutralized on its home front,
and the United States wanted Canada to have a role in the fight. As U.S. Defense
Secretary James Schlesinger said, “The basic premise, I believe, is that unless we are
prepared to defend parts of the world other than the North American continent, we will
soon have nothing more than the North American continent to defend and that would be a
calamity from the standpoint of both our nations.”60 The United States put all of its
efforts onto Canada to increase its number of troops as this was “. . .in line with the longheld U.S. view that Canadian contributions to North American defence did not offset
Canada’s obligations to Europe.”61 This subtle change in United States’ policy, to battle
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the Soviets on the European mainland, had direct and indirect influence on Canadian
policy, as the argument for increased Canadian presence was also voiced by the European
alliance. To answer the United States’ calling for an increase in Canadian forces, by
1987 Canada had “increased its forces stationed in Europe by 1,500 and. . .” made the
commitment that “the number will grow further with improvements such as low-level air
defence.”62
Throughout the early 1980s, the main focus of Canadian policy turned to the
sharing of missile defence responsibilities with the United States. The creation of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by then-United States President Ronald Reagan, and
the idea of the Star Wars defense system, led the Canadian government to adopt the same
ideals and positions. By 1987, Canada had drafted the White Paper entitled Challenge
and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. This paper was drafted as a direct
result of Canada deciding to opt out of the SDI research undertaken by the United States.
“Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty declared that it [Challenge and
Commitment] represented a ‘made in Canada’ defence policy.”63 While this paper was
not a result of American influence, it marked the beginning of the end of American
influence on Canadian policy.
By the end of 1987, however, United States influence had returned to Canada.
Canadian policy adopted United States defence policy as “the Soviets develop new
generations of cruise missiles, as the sophistication of their SSNs increases, and as the
arctic becomes more of a strategic arena.”64 The United States’ policy of Soviet
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engagement was inputted into Canadian continental defence policy, but was of immediate
influence as this thinking brought “about a heightened American concern for continental
defence (consistent with U.S. thinking on strategic defence).”65 American fears of Soviet
aggression had suddenly become Canadian fears. By 1989, the fears of both the United
States and Canada were put to rest as the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Berlin Wall was
taken down, and the Cold War came to an end.
Peacekeeping and Canadian Breakaway: 1990-2000
By the beginning of the 1990s, Canadian military and defence policy had been
changed to incorporate an aspect that had been started by Lester Pearson: peacekeeping.
Canadian forces became integrated with United Nations forces all over the world,
engaged in skirmishes that covered the globe.
In early 1992, Canada committed troops to two major conflicts engulfing Europe
and Africa. Twelve hundred Canadian troops were attached to the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Somalia in March of that year. By the following
month, another 750 peacekeeping troops had been committed to the United Nations
operation in Somalia (UNOSOM1). These operations were conducted without any
influence from the United States, signifying a new era of Canadian defence and military
policy, one free of foreign influence.
By 1994, this idea of Canadian independence was beginning to waver. Canada
wanted to begin a de-escalation of its cooperation with the United States to focus on its
peacekeeping operations around the globe. It was believed, however, that even with
Canada staying focused on its own issues, it “[Canada] would still be obliged to rely on
the United States for help in protecting its territory and approaches – and this assistance
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would then come on strictly American terms, unmitigated by the influence Canada enjoys
as a result of its defence partnership with the United States. . .”66 The direct pressure
placed on Canada was now not only coming from the United States, but from other allies
as well.
The peacekeeping operations, however, were Canada’s policy focus. By the mid1990s, Canadian forces were highly involved in the escapades unfolding in Bosnia and
Croatia, spearheaded by NATO and the United States. These were the operations that
created a pinnacle of Canadian breakaway from U.S. influence. “Some countries,
especially the United States, came to support the use of force. . .Canada, on the other
hand, strongly encouraged the use of UN peacekeepers and the primacy and authority of
the United Nations as the legitimate organization that should respond to the Bosnian civil
war.”67 By April of 1994, however, influence by the United States once again permeated
Canadian policy, as “the Chretien government reluctantly came to support NATO-led air
strikes in spite of the fact that these subsequently led to Canadian peacekeepers being
taken hostage by the Serbs.”68 The reach of the United States was so long that the
Canadian military was not able to ward off policy influences. The direct influence placed
by the United States “proved difficult to resist, even though it meant that Canadian
peacekeepers would be put at a risk.”69
By the end of the 1990s, Canadian defence policy had returned to the aspect of
missile defence. However, the adversary was no longer the Soviet Union, rather Iraq,
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Iran, North Korea, and other countries poised against the United States. The United
States had incorporated its National Missile Defence (NMD) policy and was adamant
about having Canadian cooperation. The United States maintained, however, that if
“President Clinton decides in favour of going ahead. . .a year after a decision by the
President to proceed further with NMD, a formal invitation to participate would be
tendered to Ottawa.”70 With the United States being so adamant, was this a sign of a
lessening of influence on Canada? Would Canada finally be free of the United States in
formulating defence policy if it decided to decline the invitation? This has yet to be
proven but the projected outcomes are not highly desirable. Those involved in the
decision making for this process believe that “Canada’s declining to be involved in NMD
would almost inevitably lead to the United States eventually placing not only NMD but
also the linked warning and assessment responsibilities under an all-US command.”71 As
of 2000, Canada had maintained its steadfast position against participating in the NMD
program.
Conclusion
Over the past century, Canadian military and defence policy has reverted between
having heavy American influence to having European influence to having no influence
from outside sources whatsoever. Canada has maintained its position as a middle-power
in the world and will continue to maintain that status and will continue to grow in
strength and influence of its own. If not, and Canada decides to allow the influence of
the United States to become an integral part of its defence policy, then “Canada could let
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the United States assume the entire North American air defence role if it were willing to
have American troops stationed in Canada.”72 Canada, however, is not ready to allow
this to happen and will continue in its role as an international peacekeeper and defender
of peace. It is only a matter of time before countries realize that Canada is an
independent nation and has its minds set on its policies and will make its policies as it
sees fit.
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